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Abstract   The purpose of the project SARGOS is to develop a global alert and graded response system to answer the recent 
but strong need for securing critical civilian offshore infrastructures, vulnerable to piracy or terrorist actions from the sea. 
The challenge of protecting these infrastructures against malevolent intrusions requires to develop innovative strategies so as 
to ensure in a coordinate way the whole processing line: automatic surveillance, robust detection, continuous adjustment of 
the reaction plan and graded implementation of the relevant set of reactions.  
The system handles  x Automatic and robust detection and classification of small size maritime targets in rough sea; x Detection of suspicious behaviors in a security zone around the platform; x Formalization and modeling of graded internal and external reactions, adapted to the dangerousness of the detected 
intrusion and taking into account security rules in force on the platform, geopolitical environment and legal aspects; x Activation of progressive and reversible reactions, according to an intelligent situation analysis process. Reactions can go 
from a simple alert up to bringing non lethal reaction means into play. 
The project will materialize with the implementation of all the processing line in a single platform that will be used to carry 
out experimentations and to validate the overcoming of critical issues and the appropriateness of the proposed concept with 
regards to users  needs. 
SARGOS has been selected by the French National Research Agency (ANR) in the frame of their 2009 global safety 
program (CSOSG). 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Offshore oil installations are critical energy 
infrastructures worldwide. They so constitute privileged 
targets for terrorist or piracy actions coming from the sea. 
After the events of September, 2001, the strengthening 
of maritime security has become a top priority for all 
governments. This materialized with the definition and the 
ratification of the international ISPS code, a comprehensive 
set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port 
facilities, developed in response to the perceived threats to 
ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 
the United States. But even in this context, setting up 
appropriated security measures for direct protection of each 
oil platform is still a matter for oil & gas industry 
responsibility. 
Offshore platforms are currently equipped with 
conventional navigation radars used for surveillance 
purposes. These equipments are not suited to detect small 
threats (such as dinghies, speedboats, or jet-skis) which 
might look for colliding with or grappling platforms or 
ships undergoing loading in oil or gas terminals. Besides, 
when facing a real intrusion, there are no or few formalized 
rules so as to react using safety procedures and setting up 
autonomous dissuasive means. 
It thus turns out essential to increase the degree of 
protection of these infrastructures by developing a new 
system capable of generating alarms and of setting off  
appropriate internal and external reactions in case of a 
confirmed intrusion. 
The project SARGOS aims to satisfy this new need of 
protecting civilian offshore infrastructure vulnerable to 
terrorist or piracy actions led from sea 
The objective is to propose an innovative global system 
allowing surveillance and protection of strategic offshore 
infrastructures, by taking into account the whole processing 
line, from threat detection up to bringing into play reaction 
procedures adapted to the intrusion dangerousness. 
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2. Issues 
2.1 Stakes 
« Clearly, energy security is among the most serious 
security and economic challenges both today, and in the 
future. As the economies of the World grow and societies 
develop, so does the importance of energy. And so does the 
importance of the infrastructures that produce and supply 
this energy. Critical energy infrastructures provide the fuel 
that keeps the global economy moving and our societies 
working.  
These are the very words addressed by the OSCE 
(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in 
the starting speech of the reinforced NATO Economic 
Committee Meeting held on September 22nd 2008 in 
Brussels. 
Several disasters have already demonstrated the 
vulnerability of energy production infrastructures and the 
pressing need for a high rigor in system conception and 
procedures respect. As regards to offshore facilities, one 
must remember events such as  Piper Alpha  (July 1988) 
in which only 62 of the 229 crew members survived the 
consequences of explosions worsen by a series of human 
errors, or more recently  Macondo  (April 2010) with the 
explosion of oil rig Deepwater in Mexico Gulf. 
Offshore oil activity already supplies a third of the 
world supply and is still growing, unlike the same activity 
onshore. Oil companies currently concentrate their efforts 
on exploration and offshore production activities, which go 
rising : In the mid term, more than half of the extracted oil 
and gas will come from offshore or deep offshore fields (up 
to 2000 meters and soon 3000 meters) 
In 2010, there are approximately 3300 offshore oil wells 
throughout the world and about 420 fixed and floating 
offshore platforms have been built. The oil drilling market 
represents about 40 G$ and that of engineering, equipments 
and offshore construction counts for approximately 50 G$ 
One must admit that even though offshore 
infrastructures are designed to face extreme natural 
environments, they are not sufficiently protected against 
deliberate malevolent actions. Offshore platforms 
constitute an accomplished industrial network with regards 
to exploitation but as far as safety /security aspects are 
concerned, they represent isolated targets exposed to 
intrusions from the sea. 
The preservation of offshore oil installations integrity is 
thus a major stake at the word level. This leads to wonder 
about the consequences that could follow from the 
conjunction of terrorism and piracy, nowadays active even 
in remote maritime areas, on the energy supplying chain. 
2.2 Context 
Faced with the increasing scarcity of resources onshore, 
oil companies have first made a tactical repositioning in 
offshore production units. 
When Jenkins established in 1988, using return of 
experience at that time, the first typology of threats 
straining on oil platform, the risk of hostage taking was 
considered as particularly low because of the nature of the 
needed means and of the difficulty to reach a platform on 
the open sea. 
Since 1988, piracy has taken a considerable extent. 
Kashubsky (2008) led a very detailed survey on Nigeria 
which shows that the hypothesis according to which the 
offshore installations would be protected from the very fact 
of their remoteness does not stand any more. Events such 
as the attack in June, 2008 of Shell offshore infrastructures 
120 km off Nigeria coast ( Bonga  oil field) or the attack 
in May, 2009, of TOTAL platform in the  Amenan  oil 
field demonstrate that the distance doesn t guarantee a 
complete security any more. 
While ship boardings are multiplying (2008 and 2009 
are marked by an unprecedented increase of ship hijackings 
at sea), examples of offshore energy infrastructures attacks 
remain for the moment less frequent and get less media 
attention. But they are extremely worrying as they reveal a 
high vulnerability. For example, between mid 2006 and 
mid 2008, Jenkins finds more than twenty act of piracy 
only on Nigeria. Since then, we can in particular mention: x 19th June, 2008: Attack of  Bonga  oil field by armed 
men with speedboats. Several persons wounded. 
Closure of the field which counts for 10 % of the 
Nigerian production with approximately 225 000 
barrels a day. Impact felt on the rise in prices 
worldwide. x 31st October, 2008: Attack of  Sagitta , an offshore 
supply ship (owned by Bourbon) by heavily armed 
pirates in Cameroon - 10 persons kidnapped. x 07th January, 2009: Attack of an Exxon Mobil oil 
platform by armed men in a flat bottom ship   Money 
and valuables theft. x 23rd January, 2009: Attack of an offshore supply ship 
by 10 armed men in 2 speedboats   Money and 
valuables theft. x 26th May, 2009: Attack against an installation of the 
French company TOTAL on  Amenam  oil field in 
Nigeria. x 22nd September, 2010: 3 French employees of Bourbon 
are taken hostage off Nigeria ( Addax  oil field). x November 2010: 19 hostages taken in the delta of Niger 
during a raid on a boat and an oil platform of Afren 
company (among whom appear two French people, two 
Americans, two Indonesians and a Canadian)   8 
Nigerians kidnapped during an attack on an 
ExxonMobil installation x 17th November, 2010: pirates embarked on a speedboat 
attacked a boat of the French company Perenco which 
transported Cameroonian security forces, near an oil 
platform in the Gulf of Guinea (6 people killed). 
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2.3 Need 
The few examples above reveal the incapacity of the 
systems currently available and implemented on offshore 
infrastructures to protect them against hostile intrusions 
such as piracy.  
Offshore installations security is nowadays ensured by 
 classic  means (lookout, radio identification, AIS, traffic 
surveillance radar and resort to surveillance boats generally 
operated by subcontracting companies) 
Traffic surveillance radars are intended to detect first 
and foremost cooperative mobile of large or intermediate 
sizes. Their performances are considered insufficient to 
detect small marine targets with small radar or optronic 
signature, of course not cooperative (absence of radar 
reflector or AIS), and moving around in rough sea. They 
are also penalized by a blind zone closed to the carrier. 
VTS (Vessel Traffic Surveillance) systems allow to 
secure the commercial navigation by supplying a real-time 
image of ships movements in a given surveillance zone. 
Although they are widely operational, on the one hand their 
usual modes of detection are more particularly adapted to 
 cooperative  boats and on the other hand their maritime 
traffic management purpose is very different from the 
concept of protection against small boats hostile intrusion. 
The operational need is thus to have (as an applicative 
layer over VTS's systems) a response-making system 
dedicated to offshore platforms protection, while being 
integrated within the existing systems both those of 
production infrastructures management and those of 
various means management: this is the purpose of 
SARGOS system. 
SARGOS exploits all detection means among which 
VTS information associated with other information specific 
to the platform and its internal (topology, staff, operations 
in progress, etc.) as well as external (political context, 
expected ships, meteorology, local and international 
events, etc.) environment. 
SARGOS brings in real time to operators a decision-
making support by informing of threats and by running 
predefined reactions procedures adapted to the context. 
 
 
3. SARGOS 
 
SARGOS system aims to ensure protection of crucial 
offshore infrastructures (such as oil platform) against 
surface threats. This encompasses: x Detection of threats using a specific  frequency 
modulated continuous wave (FMCW) radar and other 
sensors; x Processing of the detected threat in order to estimate its 
dangerousness and to define the appropriate response; x Implementation of a gradual and reversible reaction 
process; 
according to the following block diagram (cf. Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 : SARGOS block diagram 
 
It should be noticed that SARGOS supplies the alert 
from a system core based on its innovative FMCW radar 
technology but SARGOS is also capable of taking into 
account all other available external data (navigation radar 
tracks, AIS information, thermal images, external 
communications, etc.) as and whenever needed, in order to 
set up a planned and gradual reaction process. 
 
3.1 General design 
 
SARGOS system includes sensors, processing and 
reaction. It is set up on an offshore platform and is adapted 
to the specific platform configuration. It is made available 
to the person in charge of the platform safety. 
3.1.1 Sensors 
The main sensor is a FMCW radar specifically designed 
to detect small marine targets at ranges up to 4 nautical 
miles. A detailed analysis of the radar echo allows 
classifying it. A degree of dangerousness is deducted using 
additional information collection. 
It should be noticed that the system is capable of taking 
into account external data supplied by internal and external 
communications means, navigation radars, AIS systems 
and infrared sensors. 
3.1.2 Processing 
The information provided by the FMCW radar and 
associated sensors is processed to define the degree of 
dangerousness of the target, to activate a possible alert with 
an appropriate priority and to define the protection means 
to be operated from the SARGOS "reaction planning" . 
SARGOS operating station is used to display the 
maritime traffic picture with suspicious tracks on the 
relevant cartographic map, and to carry out general 
administration of the system. 
3.1.3 Implementation 
The reaction means management module commands and 
controls internal and external alerts, passive 
safety / security means and non lethal deferent reaction 
means, such as light projectors, sound artillery, etc.etc. 
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3.1.4 Detection and processing logic 
SARGOS addresses the challenge of closed maritime 
protection against small boats. The problem is 
characterized by (a) the difficulty to detect such intrusions 
with classical surveillance means and (b) a short response 
time 
SARGOS proposes an innovative approach to 
characterize an alert, by developing a behavior analysis 
logic based on the gradual crossing of stages in a real-time 
universe. 
The logic of detection and processing of an intrusion is 
presented on figure 2. 
Figure 2: Intrusion detection and processing 
Mobiles detected in a predefined perimeter around the 
platform are tracked to elaborate kinematic information. 
The knowledge of each object "track" is gradually enriched 
using classification attributes (characterizing the nature of 
the detected object) and identification attributes 
(characterizing the class of identity of the same object), on 
the basis of which the dangerousness represented by the 
mobile is estimated 
3.2 Functional architecture 
 
SARGOS system consists of several functional blocks 
(cf. Figure 3). 
Figure 3: System architecture 
3.2.1 Detection 
Surveillance of the areas surrounding the offshore 
platform is carried out by using: x detections obtained with the specialized FMCW radar 
of the SARGOS system, when facing with small crafts, 
skiffs, specific floating machines (over-motorized 
dinghies) and regular ships; x Information collected by sensors associated to 
SARGOS FMCW radar: conventional navigation radar, 
IR PTZ camera, AIS system, communication means. 
The FMCW radar ensures in particular the localization 
of detected echoes, their tracking and the calculation of the 
tracks kinematics, their classification, the transmission of 
the various attributes of the tracked objects to the 
preferential radar subscribers (radar technical function, 
operational station) and data exchange with the  surface 
situation management  function. 
The  surface situation management  function ensures 
acquisition and association of information needed to 
establish a closed operational picture, information 
processing so as to define the  identity class  of the 
detected echo and to determine the threat according to the 
three following stages: 
 x dangerousness evaluation , based on a crossed analysis 
of the identity class of the detected mobile and the 
position of the detected intrusion with regard to the 
safety perimeter defined around the offshore platform; x threat ranking calculation using detected mobile 
parameters such as distance, speed and route, x analysis of the threat characterization parameters in 
order to assess the need for activating or not a 
 dangerous intrusion  alert 
 
3.2.2 Reactions 
The  dangerous intrusion  alert generated by the 
 surface situation management  function is forwarded to 
the  reactions determination  function which implements: x Possible reactions planning calculations according to 
the level of knowledge acquired on various detected 
threats (behavior criteria, identity classes, and 
comparison of the current real time situation with 
previous situations met and stored by the system). 
These calculations take into account possible 
limitations due to the territorial situation or the legal 
status of the platform; x Recommendation for activating reaction means, 
proposition subjected to the validation of the operating 
station operator. The role of this operator is to state on 
the relevance or non-relevance of sending a retort 
instruction to the  means management  module; x Activation of an in-house alert broadcasting process; 
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x Activation of an outside alert broadcasting process 
using normalized message generation in order to inform 
onshore authorities about the nature of the intrusion and 
the corresponding degree of nuisance. 
3.2.3 Means management 
The point is to elaborate operative sequences from the 
received retort orders: x Blocking of the entry points; x Putting goods and persons under protection; x Carrying out of non lethal deterrent effectors (sound 
orders, spotlights); x Carrying out of non lethal neutralization means 
(paralyzing acoustic system or other); x Carrying out of outside communications (VHF, satellite 
links) in order to transmit alerts related to real threats 
and information on their nature 
3.2.4 Visualization and Actions 
The operating station is the interface between SARGOS 
and the offshore platform manager. It enables the 
panoramic display of system tracks on the close platform 
surface situation. It gives the operator decision-making 
means as well as action means (validation of the gradual 
responses proposed by the system and authorization of 
setting off the recommended set of reactions). 
3.2.5 Record &Replay 
The operational functions of SARGOS are completed by 
recording and replay capacities. 
Replay allows the analysis of functioning logic based on 
operational test scenarios, especially during the 
development phase. 
Detections and reactions recording has several purposes: x To distinguish real threats from false alarms by 
retrospect analysis; x To provide proof; x To pass data to other entities for prevention purposes,  x To evaluate the efficiency and the relevance of 
activated reactions (internal / external) 
Such a posteriori data based on feedback are quite 
valuable for insurers or financiers who need objective 
statistics in order to quantify risks. 
 
3.3 System implementation 
SARGOS proposes an automated process to analyze 
situations, to set off alerts and to elaborate plans with 
progressive and reversible reactions to be implemented. 
The system brings three phases into play: x Stage 1 : Automatic surveillance 
At first, the system is stand-alone. SARGOS monitors the 
surface situation with tracks provided by various sensors, 
and estimates the dangerousness of each craft navigating 
near the platform. When the level of dangerousness reaches 
a threshold, the system leaves the  Automatic surveillance  
phase to enter the  Alert  phase. x Stage 2 : Alert 
One of the system tracks reaches a level of dangerousness 
above the alert threshold: the operator assessment is 
required. An alarm is generated so as to warn the operator 
about the detected risk. The system video cameras are 
turned toward the threat in order to propose visu.al 
identification means x Stage 3 : Processing  
The system enters the  reactions processing   
The operator has been acquainted with the situation; he has 
confirmed and identified the threat. The system enters the 
reactions processing phase. The system proposes to the 
operator a reaction plan based on the threat nature and on 
the time required to carry on these reactions. 
 
4. Operating Station 
 
First and foremost, SARGOS addresses the issue of 
surveillance and protection of civilian infrastructures: the 
system shouldn t require dedicated staff devoted to people 
and goods protection; it has to remain compatible with 
exploitation by a non-specialized operator having for first 
objective the daily oil production and being potentially put 
under stress if confronted to a crisis situation. 
To assure a fast and comprehensive apprehension of the 
situation, SARGOS information is displayed on two 
adjacent screens: 
The first screen shows (cf. Figure 4): x The tactical surface situation displayed on a map 
enriched with relevant maritime information, detected 
ships sorted regarding their dangerousness; x A decision making support presenting the plan of 
reaction elaborated using reaction modeling 
approaches. 
Figure 4 : Operating station   Surface situation 
management screen 
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The second screen is reserved for video camera imaging 
in order to allow threat identification. It is divided into 3 
areas: x The banner is used to display either the current 
panoramic view of the scene, or an historical 
background allowing to show to the operator  pictures 
captured before he arrived; x A close view focused on the detected threat, so as to 
enable the operator to validate the class of craft and the 
threat identity class; x A close IR view complementing the day vision to 
improve threat identification. 
Figure 5: Operating station   Identification screen 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The challenge of protecting critical civilian 
infrastructures against malevolent intrusions requires 
developing innovative strategies so as to ensure in a 
coordinate way the whole processing line: automatic 
surveillance, robust detection, continuous adjustment of the 
reaction plan and graded implementation of the relevant set 
of reactions. 
SARGOS proposes a global alert and graded response 
system, and so answer the recent but strong need for 
securing civilian offshore infrastructures, vulnerable to 
malevolent acts, piracy or terrorism from the sea. 
The system handles: x Automatic and robust detection and classification of 
small size maritime targets in rough sea; x Detection of suspicious behaviors in a security zone 
around the platform; x Formalization and modeling of graded internal and 
external reactions, adapted to the dangerousness of the 
detected intrusion and taking into account security rules 
in force on the platform, geopolitical environment and 
legal aspects; 
x Activation of progressive and reversible reactive 
actions, according to an intelligent situation analysis 
process. Reactions can go from a simple alert up to 
bringing non lethal reaction means into play 
The project will materialize with the implementation of 
all the processing line in a single platform that will be used 
to carry out experimentations and to validate the 
overcoming of critical issues and the appropriateness of the 
proposed concept with regards to users  needs. 
This transversal and systemic approach relies on 
multidisciplinary competences, capitalized into the 
consortium SARGOS. This consortium is composed of 
well fitted and complementary skills with a SME as 
coordinator (SOFRESUD), 3 industrial entities (DCNS, 
Rockwell Collins France and CS SI), and 3 research 
organisms (TéSA, ARMINES/CRC and CDMT) with the 
support of public bodies (DGA Techniques Navales). 
Work is made under the aegis of a steering committee 
which includes representatives of two main French oil and 
gas companies TOTAL and GDF Suez, of the DGA and 
the French Navy, also gathered into a users committee 
which is sought to communicate the need, to strengthen the 
technical objectives, to validate the chosen scenarios and to 
assess the relevance of the obtained results. 
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